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Abstract This paper examines how a government should intervene when agents
make choices having long-term detrimental effects on their life expectancy. For that
purpose, we consider an economy where some agents consume a sin good (reducing
their survival chances) out of myopia, and regret their choices later on, whereas other
agents make, because of their impatience, the same risky choices, which they never
regret. We argue that, in the first-best, a government should only interfere with behav-
iors that agents will regret, but not with other behaviors. In the second-best, asymmet-
ric information and redistributive concerns imply interferences not only with myopic
behaviors, but also with impatience-based (rational) behaviors. Finally, we introduce
heterogeneity in individual earnings, and show that the optimal tax on the sin good
depends on the size of the myopic group, on the reactivity of sin good consumption
to tax changes, and on the extent to which sin good consumption is correlated with
labor earnings.
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1 Introduction
Undoubtedly, the consumption of “sin goods”—i.e. goods that generate instantaneous
satisfaction at the cost of worse future living conditions—is an old practice, probably
as old as religions, morals, or state laws regulating such activities. Drinking, smok-
ing, or taking drugs are as ancient as mankind. But sin goods consumption still pre-
vails today, as illustrated by Fig. 1, which shows alcohol and tobacco uses around
the world.1 Although there exists a significant inter-country variation, the consump-
tion of alcohol and tobacco is a widespread phenomenon, which takes place in most
areas of the world. True, those data are national averages, which may hide a large
heterogeneity within countries. It is also clear that sin goods consumption is low in
several countries.2 But apart from few exceptions, sin goods consumption is a size-
able phenomenon, in particular in European countries, which lie in the upper-right
corner.3
Such a widespread consumption of alcohol and tobacco is a somewhat surprising
fact, since it is now widely acknowledged, among scientists, that both alcohol and
tobacco consumptions have a negative effect on survival. Empirical evidence on the
negative impact of cigarettes on health dates back to the 1950s (see Doll and Hill
1950), and the negative influence of excess alcohol consumption is also widely docu-
mented (see Poikolainen 1982).4 To give an idea of the size of the effects at work, let
us briefly refer to the longitudinal study by Kaplan et al. (1987). That study showed
that individuals above age 60 who were current smokers in 1965 faced, during the
next 17 years, an overall mortality risk that is 1.47 times the risk of those who never
smoked.
In the light of their sizeable effects on health and survival, sin goods constitute an
obvious subject of concerns for governments. The fiscal treatment of sin goods is a
true challenge for policy makers. Various aspects of the problem have been examined
in the recent years.5 In particular, a large attention has been paid to the normative
issue of the optimal fiscal treatment of sin goods, in lines with the recent behavioral
public economics, which supports public intervention as a way to prevent agents with
behavioral imperfections from making mistakes. Gruber and Koszegi (2000, 2001)
derive optimal taxes of addictive bads in the presence of time-inconsistent agents, i.e.
1Sources: World Health Organization, WHO Statistical Information System, retrieved on 01/12/2008, at
http://www.who.int/whosis/data/. The sample includes 123 countries.
2Those exceptions include some sub-Saharian economies (e.g. Ethiopia, Chad, Eritrea), where the con-
sumption of alcohol and tobacco is very low, as well as some Middle-East countries, where alcohol con-
sumption is close to zero (e.g. Iran, Saudi Arabia, Oman).
3On the relation between alcohol and tobacco uses, see Decker and Schwartz (2000).
4Note that demographic studies on the impact of sin goods focused also recently on the impact of excessive
or inadequate eating (Bender et al. 1998; Stamler 1973).
5Those aspects include the reactivity of sin goods consumption to taxes (see, for cigarettes: Chaloupka and
Wechsler 1997; Grignon 2007; Chaloupka et al. 2010; Forster and Jones 2010), the impact of international
differentials in sin taxes on purchasing behaviors (Beatty et al. 2009), and the regressiveness of sin taxes
(Lyon and Schwab 1995). Other topics include the addictive nature of sin goods (see Orphanides and
Zervos 1995; Suranovic et al. 1999; Kenkel et al. 2002), and the size of the negative externalities due to
sin goods (see Viscusi 1995; Chaloupka and Warner 2000; Cnossen and Smart 2005; Cnossen 2007).
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Fig. 1 Alcohol and tobacco censumptions in the world
agents who are impatient when they face a choice between today and tomorrow, but
who would like to become patient in the future, so that there is an internal conflict
between the current and the future selves. They argue that taxing sin goods can serve
as a self-control device for time-inconsistent agents with hyperbolic preferences à
la Laibson (1997), and solve the optimal tax problem for three types of agents taken
separately: (1) time-consistent agents; (2) sophisticated time-inconsistent agents, who
know that they will change their mind in the future, and behave strategically accord-
ing to this; (3) naïve time-inconsistent agents, who are unaware that they will be
impatient again in the future.6 Optimal sin taxes are also studied by O’Donoghe and
Rabbin (2003, 2006), who consider an economy where agents differ in their taste
for the sin good and in their degree of time-inconsistency (still modeled by hyper-
bolic preferences). They highlight the trade-off between, on the one hand, creating
consumption distortions for the fully self-controlled persons, and, on the other hand,
reducing overconsumption by persons with self-control problems.7 Finally, Cremer
et al. (2008) study optimal sin taxes when agents, who have self-control problems,
can mitigate the current impact of past consumption decisions thanks to curative ex-
penditures. When deriving the optimal tax policy, they distinguish between the case
6On the regressivity of sin taxes in that framework, see Gruber and Koszegi (2004).
7That trade-off is also examined by Haavio and Kotakorpi (2009), who consider how individuals would
vote on sin goods taxes.
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where all time-inconsistent agents realize their mistakes and try to correct them, and
the case where all time-inconsistent agents never realize their mistakes.
The goal of the present paper is to re-examine the optimal taxation of sin goods,
by paying attention to other dimensions of heterogeneity among agents. Our contri-
bution to the existing literature is twofold. First, we allow for a diversity of sin goods
consumers regarding their attitude toward past consumption. Some consumers will
regret their past decisions, whereas others will have no regret, and we characterize
the optimal tax policy when all those types of sin goods consumers coexist within the
population.8 Second, we also consider another source of heterogeneity: differences
in individual earnings, and examine how that heterogeneity affects the optimal fiscal
treatment of sin goods.9
The relevancy, for optimal policy-making, of heterogeneity among sin goods con-
sumers can hardly be overemphasized.10 Actually, a vast empirical literature shows
that some sin goods consumers exhibit regrets later on in their life (i.e. they would
like to come back earlier in life and act differently), whereas other sin goods users
do not regret their past choices. The coexistence of regretting and non-regretting sin
good consumers was emphasized, for instance, by Slovic (2001), who found, on the
basis of a telephone survey of a representative sample of US respondents, that 85%
of adult smokers stated that they would not start smoking if they had to do it over
again.11 Note that the co-existence of regretting and non-regretting sin goods con-
sumers is crucial for optimal policy. Sin goods consumers who regret ex post can be
regarded as having suffered from a myopia at the time of making their decision, in
the sense that those agents underestimated, at that time, the negative effects of sin
goods on future health. That myopia can be regarded as involving some kind of lim-
ited rationality, and as such, this requires a public intervention. Myopic agents would
welcome a government that would force them to behave differently (i.e. with a bal-
anced concern for both short-run and long-term interests). On the contrary, regretless
sin goods consumers do not need any governmental intervention: those risk-takers are
rational, and the principle of consumer sovereignty recommends not to interfere with
their choices. The need for correcting the myopia of some sin good consumers while
letting others unaffected raises particular difficulties under asymmetric information
on agents’ type, which are examined in this paper.
Moreover, when designing the optimal taxation of sin goods, another dimension
to be taken into account is the heterogeneity in terms of earnings. Actually, when the
consumption of sin goods concerns individuals with lower incomes, taxing sin goods
consumption may have quite regressive effects, which may be undesirable from a so-
cial perspective. Therefore, it is important to take earnings differentials into account.
8As such, we depart from Gruber and Koszegi (2000, 2001) and Cremer et al. (2008), who only consider
one type of sin good consumers at a time.
9Hence, we complement O’Donoghe and Rabbin (2003, 2006).
10Note that there exists also strong differences between those who consume sin goods and those who do
not. See, for instance, Khwaja et al. (2009) on how these value health.
11That result is robust to various countries. In the U.K., Jarvis et al. (2002) showed that about 83% of
smokers “would not start smoking if they had their time again”. Finally, Fong et al. (2004) showed, on the
basis of a telephone survey in Canada, the US, the UK, and Australia that about 90% of smokers agree
with the statement “if you had to do it over again, you would not have started smoking”.
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Various studies support the existence of significant correlations between income and
sin goods consumption. Levine et al. (1997), Heineck and Schwarze (2003), Van Ours
(2004), Auld (2005), and Braakmann (2008) all report the existence of a wage penalty
attached to smoking, ranging from 2% to 24%. More recently, Anger and Kvasnicka
(2010) confirm the existence of a 4 to 10% wage penalty for current smokers in com-
parison to never-smokers. Regarding alcohol consumption, empirical studies point
also to a correlation, but of a positive sign (see Van Ours 2004; Lye and Hirschberg
2004; Auld 2005). Those studies justify the introduction of heterogeneity in individ-
ual earnings as an essential aspect of the design of optimal sin taxes.
In order to re-examine the optimal taxation of sin goods when agents differ in ex
post regrets and in individual earnings, we develop a two-period model where the
probability of survival from the first period (young adulthood) to the second period
(old age) depends on sin good consumption when being young. The population is
composed of three types of agents: (1) farsighted agents, (2) myopic risk-takers (with
regrets ex post) and (3) rational risk-takers, who are guided by their impatience (but
without any regrets ex post).12 In a first stage, we assume uniform earnings and study
the optimal tax policy, under a perfect observability of types (i.e. first-best) and asym-
metric information (i.e. second-best). Then, in a second stage, we introduce earnings
inequalities, and characterize the optimal linear taxation policy in that context.
Anticipating our results, we show that, at the first-best, the government should in-
terfere only with myopic risky behaviors (to avoid regrets), but not with rational risky
behaviors. Hence, it is optimal to tax sin goods consumption for myopic agents (but
not for others), in such a way as to induce the myopics into behaving with concern
for the long-term. However, in the second-best, particularly when agents differ not
only in terms of myopia but also of income, asymmetric information, and redistribu-
tive concerns may imply interferences with rational risky behaviors as well. We also
examine the determinants of optimal sin taxes, and argue for a differentiated fiscal
treatment of sin goods.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the basic model,
where agents of three types—farsighted, myopic, and impatient—choose their con-
sumption of a sin good (impatience being taken as a proxy for risk taking behavior).
Section 3 characterizes the first-best optimum, and studies its decentralization. The
second-best problem is examined in Sect. 4. Finally, Sect. 5 adds a second source of
heterogeneity, earnings, and studies the optimal linear taxation problem. Conclusions
are drawn in Sect. 6.
12We are well aware that having a high impatience and having a low risk-aversion are two distinct aspects
of human personality. While these two traits can be both regarded as implying risk-taking behaviors, we
shall here use the former rather than the latter, as this is more convenient for analytical purposes. But
note that assuming agents with distinct risk-aversions would not affect our conclusions, as these only
presuppose that a given risky behavior causes regrets among some people (type-2 agents), and no regret
among others (type-3 agents).
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2 The basic model
2.1 Environment
We consider a population of agents who live, at best, two periods. The first period
(i.e. young age) is lived with certainty, whereas the second period (i.e. old age) is
lived with a probability π . That probability of survival depends negatively on the
consumption of a sin good at the young age, denoted y, through the survival function
π = π(y)
with π ′(y) < 0 and π ′′(y) > 0.
At the beginning of the first period, agents allocate their (fixed) earnings between
current consumption c, savings s, and the sin good y. Sin goods consumption involves
an immediate satisfaction, but at the cost of future inconveniences, which take here
the form of a lower survival probability π .
Time preferences playing a crucial role when weighting gains and losses associ-
ated with sin goods consumption, it makes sense to assume that sin goods consump-
tion differentials are due to heterogeneity regarding time preferences. However, as
stated above, the population who consumes sin goods is heterogeneous in terms of
ex post regrets, in the sense that some sin goods consumers will regret their deci-
sions in the future, whereas other consumers will not.13 Therefore, we assume that
the population is composed of three types of agents:14
• Type-1 agents are farsighted;
• Type-2 agents are myopic, but with a dual self: they would like, ex post, to have
been forced to behave as farsighted (i.e. regrets ex post);
• Type-3 agents are impatient; they do not care about the future (without any regret
ex post).
A first, major difference between our three types is that, whereas type-1 agents
care significantly about the future, type-2 and type-3 agents care less about the future.
As we shall see, that difference is a key driver of the sin goods consumption decision,
in the sense that type-1 agents consume sin goods moderately, whereas type-2 and
type-3 agents consume more sin goods, since they assign a lower weight to future
welfare losses due to sin good consumption.
Despite their common tendency to consume sin goods, type-2 and type-3 agents
differ from each others, since type-2 agents will have regrets about their past con-
sumption decision, contrary to type-3 agents, who will never have any regret.15 By
“regretting” their past consumption, we mean that type-2 agents will, at the end of the
13On the prevalence of regrets among smokers, see Slovic (2001), Jarvis et al. (2002) and Fong et al.
(2004).
14We shall denote by ni the number of agents of type i = 1,2,3.
15Myopic agents are, in some sense, characterized by a tension between their two selves, that of instant
gratification and that of long term welfare. Ex post, when facing the negative effect of their past sin good
consumption, they regret their past decisions, in the sense that they would like to come back to the past, to
change these. Hence, they would be grateful to a public intervention acting as a self-control device.
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young age, consider that they made a mistake when choosing how much sin goods
to consume.16 In other words, type-2 agents will, at the end of the young age, real-
ize that their past decision was wrong, and will thus regret their past choices. There
are various ways to make mistakes, but here we consider that the source of mistake
and regrets by type-2 agents is a myopia, in the sense that those agents made their
sin good consumption decision without taking into account the effect it will have on
their future.17 Type-3 agents, on the contrary, will not have any regret, and will thus
not consider that their past sin good consumption was a mistake.18
The heterogeneity of agents in terms of time preferences and in terms of regrets
with respect to past choices is modeled here by means of pairs of time preference
parameters (αi, βi), where αi denotes the time preference factor that governed the
agent’s decisions at the beginning of young adulthood, whereas βi denotes the time
preference factor that should have governed past decisions, from the perspective of
the agent arrived at the end of young adulthood. For type-1 and type-3 agents, there
is an equality between αi and βi , whereas the same is not true for type-2 agents,
for whom α2 differs from β2, explaining regrets about past decisions. The following
table summarizes our notations.
Types ex ante ex post regrets
time preferences time preferences
1: farsighted α1 β1 no, as α1 = β1
2: myopic α2 β2 yes, as α2 = β2
3: impatient α3 β3 no, as α3 = β3
Note that, in terms of sin good consumptions, type-2 and type-3 cannot be distin-
guished (as they all consume the same amount of sin good). Hence, in terms of the
time preference factor αi weighting the second-period utility of agents, there is an
equality of time preference parameters for types 2 and 3, that is, between α2 and α3.
We also know that type-1 agents care more about the future, so that α1 > α2 = α3.
Throughout this paper, we shall, for the simplicity of presentation, assume that type-2
and type-3 agents act in such a way that they do not assign any weight to the second
period: α2 = α3 = 0.19 That assumption simplifies the analysis significantly, which
will be most useful when introducing additional sources of heterogeneity latter on
(see Sect. 5).
16Note that in a two-period model with possible death after period 1, there cannot be regrets in period 2
(as one may be dead), so that regrets must take place at the end of period 1.
17The widespread feeling of invulnerability among young adults and adolescents (see Quadrel et al. 1993)
can be regarded as a form of myopia.
18A good way to sort out those two types of sin good consumers would be to observe their behavior in
case of vote on a tax (or even a prohibition) on the sin good. The regretless consumers would vote for a
tax equal to zero. In contrast, the regretful myopics, assuming that they are sophisticated, would vote for
the tax (or even the prohibition), which they perceive as a commitment device (see Cremer et al. 2007).
19Assuming α2 = α3 > 0 would not change our results fundamentally. Only the extent of myopia for
type-2 agents would be reduced, but no major qualitative change would occur.
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Finally, it should be stressed that regrets modeled as a differential between α2 and
β2, could take several forms: one could, ex post, turn out to care more about the old
age than initially, i.e. β2 > α2, or the opposite, that is, one could turn out, ex post,
to care less about the old age than initially, i.e. β2 < α2. Given that the empirical
literature on regrets among smokers suggests that regretting smokers would prefer
not to have started smoking or to have smoked less, we will assume, throughout the
paper, that the regrets take the form of β2 > α2. In other words, regretting sin goods
consumers will, at the end of young adulthood, look at their past life differently, and
consider that their past sin good consumption was excessive in comparison to what is
the best for them.
2.2 The laissez-faire
An agent of type i = 1,2,3 chooses the first-period and second-period consumptions
of the normal good ci and di , as well as the consumption of the sin good yi , in such
a way as to maximize his expected lifetime utility subject to his budget constraint,
the utility of death being normalized to zero. It is assumed, for simplicity, that a
perfect annuity market exists, and that there is a zero interest rate, so that the return
on savings is 1/πi . Moreover, individual utility is assumed to be quasi linear in first-
period consumption for convenience.
Hence, the problem of each agent of type i can be written as
max
ci ,di ,yi
ci + v(yi) + αiπ(yi)u(di)
subject to the budget constraint
ci + yi + diπ(yi) ≤ w,
where v(yi) is the utility derived from the consumption of the sin good (v′(yi) >
0, v′′(yi) < 0), while w is the income endowment of the agent.
The first-order conditions yield20
1 = μ,
αiu
′(di) = μ,
v′(yi) + αiπ ′(yi)u(di) = μ
(
1 + π ′(yi)di
)
.
Given that α2 = α3 = 0, we have
u′(d1) = 1
α1
,
d2 = d3 = 0,
v′(y1) = 1 − π ′(y1)α1
[
u(d1) − u′(d1)d1
]
> 1,
v′(y2) = v′(y3) = 1.
20μ denotes the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget constraint.
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From this, it is not difficult to see that agents of types 2 and 3 save nothing, as the
second period does not matter for them, contrary to type-1 agents, who save some
resources. Moreover, agents of types 2 and 3 consume also the same amount of sin
good y2 = y3, which is higher than the one consumed by type-1 agents. The reason
why y1 < y2 = y3 is that type-1 agents care about the negative impact of the sin good
on the probability of survival, unlike type-2 and type-3 agents, who do not care, ex
ante, about the old age. As a consequence, agents of type 1, by choosing a lower
consumption of sin good, have also a higher survival probability than type-2 and
type-3 agents, who have a low and identical survival probability: π1 > π2 = π3.
Note, however, that although agents of types 2 and 3 make, under α2 = α3, exactly
the same choices, the motivations underlying those choices differ. Agents of type 3
are fully rational and consistent: at the end of period 1, when they face the level of the
survival probability π3 < π1, they express no regret: this is the mere result of their
choice and their impatience, to which they still adhere.21 On the contrary, agents of
type 2, when facing π2 = π3 < π1, express regrets: their myopia did not allow them to
see the impact of sin good consumption on the survival probability, and if they could
go back to their youth (i.e. the beginning of period 1), they would act differently from
what they did, and would opt for a lower sin good consumption.
In our framework, the occurrence of regrets takes the form of a differential be-
tween the time preference parameter that governed the choices of agents, i.e. αi , and
the time preference that they use when they evaluate their welfare at the end of young
adulthood, i.e. βi . For agents of types 1 and 3, αi and βi are equal, so that there is no
regret. Thus, for those agents, the levels of ci , di and yi chosen at the beginning of
young adulthood maximize their welfare as evaluated at the end of young adulthood,
which can be written as
ci + v(yi) + βiπ(yi)u(di).
However, the same is not true for type-2 agents. The levels of c2, d2, and y2 that
were chosen at the beginning of young adulthood do not maximize the above expres-
sion, because these were chosen on the basis of α2, which is lower than β2. To see
this, it suffices to notice that the optimal level of sin good, computed ex post, satisfies
the FOC:
v′(y2) + β2π ′(y2)u(d2) = 1 + π ′(y2)d2
whereas, at the beginning of young adulthood, type-2 agents choose, given α2 = 0, a
level of y2 such that:
v′(y2) = 1 + π ′(y2)d2.
Hence, under β2π ′(y2)u(d2) < 0, the optimal amount of sin good is strictly lower
than what was actually chosen at the beginning of young adulthood. This explains the
occurrence of regrets for type-2 agents once they reach the end of young adulthood
(i.e. the end of period 1).
21In other words, they would be willing to act again in the same way if some time-traveling machine
existed.
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3 The first-best problem
The design of an optimal public policy requires first to select a social objective. For
that purpose, we shall assume that the social planner is utilitarian, that is, that his
goal is to maximize the sum of all agents’ welfare, each agent being assigned an
equal weight in the social welfare function.
Note, however, that an adherence to utilitarianism does not suffice, in the present
context, to fully describe the social objective to be pursued by the government. The
reason has to do with the existence of a tension between how type-2 agents behave ex
ante and how they evaluate their past choices ex post. As we just saw, type-2 agents
do not have the same preferences at the beginning and at the end of young adulthood.
This raises the question of the selection of the preferences to be taken into account in
the utilitarian calculus.
Throughout this paper, we assume that the preferences to be taken into account
are the ex post ones, i.e. the ones represented by the βi parameters, and not the αi
parameters. This choice does not make any difference for type-1 and type-3 agents
(for whom αi = βi ), but this is not the case regarding type-2 agents, for whom
α2 < β2. Actually, the utilitarian social planner will solve his social welfare maxi-
mization problem while taking the ex post preferences of type-2 agents into account
(i.e. β2), in such a way as to avoid the occurrence of regrets. Thus, the social planner
will take into account how type-2 agents, once they are at the end of young adulthood,
will look at their life, and not how these have considered their life ex ante (i.e. at the
beginning of young adulthood).
Our normative approach can be justified by referring to what is called the “new
paternalism”. The idea is that the government has, as a function, to intervene in order
to help agents who suffer from behavioral imperfections, in such a way as to avoid
the occurrence of frustrations, regrets, or inconsistencies. According to that approach,
the government should ideally interfere with agents having behavioral imperfections,
but not with other agents, whose decisions have to be respected, in the name of the
principle of consumer sovereignty.22 That kind of paternalism is defended, among
others, by O’Donoghe and Rabbin (2003), under the name of “cautious” paternalism,
and by Camerer et al. (2003), under the name of “asymmetric” paternalism. In each
case, the government faces a trade-off between, on the one hand, the benefits from a
public intervention preventing some agents from making mistakes, and, on the other
hand, the costs implied by that intervention for fully rational agents.23
Note that, in the context of sin goods consumption, adopting a “new” paternalism
differs strongly from adopting an “old” paternalistic perspective. Indeed, whereas
it could be argued, from an “old” paternalistic perspective, that both myopic and
impatient sin good consumers do not behave in their best interests, we consider here
that the different attitudes of agents ex post (i.e. occurrence of regrets for type-2
agents and not for type-3 agents) invite a distinct treatment of those types by the
22Note that, in the presence of externalities, then there could be a motivation for interfering with agents’s
choices, but here there is no externality, so that we should not interfere with rational decision-makers.
23On the new paternalism and its translation into optimal policies, see also Thaler and Sunstein (2003) and
Cremer et al. (2008).
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government, even though their behavior is exactly the same. By doing so, we are
opposed to the “old” paternalism, which would recommend a similar treatment of
rational risk-takers and myopics, on the grounds that sin goods consumption is “bad”,
whatever the underlying motivations are.24
Finally, one should notice that our choice to rely on the ex post preferences of
agents as a basis for the utilitarian calculus needs also to be justified. Given that
type-2 agents have a dual self, it is inevitable that a government will have to make a
choice between the two selves, that is, will have to select one set of preferences as a
basis for making his calculations. Instead of our reliance on βi parameters, one could
have, for instance, taken the ex ante preferences as a basis (i.e. the αi parameters).25
The reason why the social planner takes here the ex post preferences into account has
to do with an early utilitarian tradition, which regards preferences based on past ex-
perience as superior to other, less experienced, preferences. That tradition dates back
to the refinement of utilitarianism by Mill (1863). According to Mill, utilitarianism
should rely on well-formed preferences, that is, preferences that have a constant sup-
port over time, and not preferences that turn out to be questioned.26 Thus, from that
perspective, the fact that type-2 agents end up regretting their past choices is a good
reason for taking their ex post preferences into account and not their ex ante prefer-
ences.
3.1 The first-best optimum
The problem faced by the utilitarian social planner can be written as the choice of
first- and second-period consumptions ci , di and sin good consumption yi for the
three types of agents. As stated above, the social planner does not want to interfere
with the choices of agents of types 1 and 3, as those agents are acting in a consistent
way, that is, without any regret. On the contrary, the planner would like to correct
the myopia of type-2 agents. The social planner can achieve those goals by using, in
his social objective function, the ex post preference parameters βi . Given that those
parameters coincide with the αi parameters for agents of types 1 and 3, the social
planner’s solution will be in conformity with the principle of consumer sovereignty
for those agents. However, for type-2 agents, using β2 instead of α2 in the social
welfare function will also allow the planner to prevent type-2 agents from regretting
their choices ex post.
The Lagrangian of the social planner’s problem can be written as
£ =
∑
i=1,2,3
ni
{
V
[
ci + v(yi) + βiπ(yi)u(di)
] − μ[ci + yi + π(yi)di − w
]}
,
where V (·) is a strictly concave transform, while μ is the Lagrange multiplier asso-
ciated with the budget constraint.
24Note that such an old-style paternalism seems hardly justifiable, as this relies on a questionable set of
“good” and “bad” things established independently from what people think.
25One could also take a convex combination of parameters αi and βi .
26In Mill’s terms, such well-formed preferences are associated with “high quality” pleasures, in contrast
with “low quality” pleasures. The Principle of Utility has to be refined accordingly, as the promotion of
the largest happiness—in quantity and quality—for the largest number (see Mill 1863, on pp. 262–263).
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The FOCs yield
V ′(xi) = μ,
V ′(xi)βiπ(yi)u′(di) = μπ(yi),
V ′(xi)
[
v′(yi) + βiπ ′(yi)u(di)
] = μ(1 + π ′(yi)di
)
,
where xi ≡ ci + v(yi) + βiπ(yi)u(di) denotes the argument of the transform V (·),
that is, the welfare of an agent of type i. It should be stressed here that the variable xi
depends on the ex post preferences of agents, that is, on the parameters βi (and not
on the parameters αi ). Hence, one can refer to the variable xi as the ex post welfare
of agents of type i.27
From the FOCs, we have, given β3 = 0, that:
u′(di) = 1
βi
, i = 1,2,
d3 = 0,
v′(yi) = 1 − βiπ ′(yi)
[
u(di) − u′(di)di
]
, i = 1,2,
v′(y3) = 1
so that, given β1 = β2 > 0, we can deduce
d1 = d2 > d3 = 0,
y1 = y2 < y3.
Thus, in the first-best optimum, type-3 agents do not consume anything in the
second period, contrary to agents of types 1 and 2. Agents of types 1 and 2 con-
sume a small amount of sin goods, while type-3 agents consume a higher amount.
But resources are distributed in such a way that the expected lifetime welfare is,
from the point of view of the social planner, equalized across all types, as we have
x1 = x2 = x3.
3.2 Decentralization
To see how the social optimum can be decentralized, let us now compare the FOCs
under the laissez-faire with the ones under the first-best, and try to identify fiscal
instruments that will make those FOCs coincide with each others, implying that these
instruments allow for the decentralization of the social optimum. Clearly, the social
planner does not need to interfere with the choices of agents of type 1, as there is
a perfect identity between the FOCs under laissez-faire and at the first-best for that
type of agents. The same is also true for agents of type 3. However, the planner must
27To be more precise, the variable xi is a measure of the average ex post lifetime welfare for agents of
type i, since a group of agents of type i involves long-lived and short-lived persons, with proportions equal
to respectively πi and 1 − πi . Hence, xi is a measure of the average ex post welfare in the group i.
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interfere with the choice of type-2 agents, and at two levels: the savings decision and
the sin goods consumption.
Actually, the laissez-faire level of second-period consumption, equal to zero, is
inferior to the first-best level, which is strictly positive, because β2 > α2 = 0. Thus,
in order to decentralize the first-best optimum, the government must force type-2
agents to pay a tax T2 in the first period, and uses this to finance a pension P2 in the
second period, which is given only in case of survival. Provided T2 and P2 are equal
to:28
T2 = π(y2)d2,
P2 = d2
this forced pension system for type-2 agents induces the first-best consumption path.
Indeed, type-2 agents still choose to have no savings under that system, but their
second-period consumption is now equal to the pension P2. At this stage, it should be
stressed that this forced savings system is here necessary, and cannot be replaced by
any standard linear subsidy on savings. The reason is that the savings of type-2 agents
at the laissez-faire is, given α2 = 0, a corner solution, and equal to 0, so that no linear
subsidy could ever make type-2 agents save.29 Note that, if we had assumed 0 <
α2 < β2 instead, then the laissez-faire savings would have been an interior solution,
and thus a saving subsidy could have been used to decentralize the optimum savings
level for type-2 agents.
Note, however, that the pension system {T2,P2} does not affect the consumption
of the sin good, as we have quasi-linear utility in y2. Therefore, the pension system
{T2,P2} is necessary but not sufficient for the decentralization of the social optimum.
This requires also another instrument insuring that type-2 agents choose the optimal
level of sin good consumption y2.
Regarding the decentralization of the first-best optimum of sin goods consump-
tion, let us notice that the FOC for the first-best level of y2 is
v′(y2) = 1 − π ′(y2)β2
[
u(d2) − u′(d2)d2
]
whereas, under a tax θ2 on y2, the laissez-faire level of y2 is characterized by
v′(y2) = 1 + θ2.
Hence, the first-best level of sin good consumption can be decentralized by means
of a tax θ2 equal to
θ2 = −π ′(y2)β2
[
u(d2) − u′(d2)d2
]
> 0,
where d2 and y2 take their first-best levels. This tax depends positively on β2, and
is thus increasing in the degree of myopia of the agent. The tax depends also on the
sensitivity of the survival probability to the consumption of y2.
28Note that d2 and y2 take here their first-best levels.
29Even a 100% subsidy of savings would not make type-2 agents save under α2 = 0.
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Thus, under the pension system {T2,P2} and the tax θ2, type-1 and type-2 agents
have exactly the same bundles. This will also prevent type-2 agents from regretting
their choices, and from envying type-1 agents ex post.
Finally, note that, in order to achieve the equality of marginal social utilities, the
implementation of the first-best may also require some lump sum transfers across
groups 1, 2 and 3. However, given that those three types of agents have the same
endowment, one could argue that the role of the government should be restricted to
the (forced) pension system {T2,P2} and the Pigouvian tax θ2 on the sin good, in the
name of responsibility.
4 The second-best problem
Let us now consider the second-best problem, in which the social planner cannot
observe the types of agents. Under such a limited observability of types, it is likely
that myopic agents (i.e. type-2 agents) will pretend to be impatient agents (i.e. type-3
agents), in order to escape from the forced savings system proposed by the planner at
the first-best. Indeed, even though this forced pension system is built for the good of
type-2 agents, those agents, being myopic, cannot realize, ex ante, that such a system
would be good for them. As a consequence, type-2 agents might prefer pretending to
be of type-3, in such a way as to receive from the social planner the bundle designed
for type-3 agents.
Note also that such “mimicking behaviors” are not restricted to type-2 agents. For
instance, farsighted agents (i.e. type-1 agents) may also be tempted to lie on their
type, in such a way as to benefit from a more favorable bundle. Clearly, type-1 agents
could be tempted to pretend to be myopic agents (i.e. type-2 agents). The reason is
that once we refine the bundles of type-2 agents to prevent the mimicking of type-3
agents, type-1 agents might then be tempted to pretend to be of type-2, in order to
benefit from a more attractive bundle.
4.1 The second-best optimum
As a consequence of those mimicking possibilities, the imperfect observability of
types requires the addition of two self-selection constraints. Hence, the Lagrangian
of the second-best problem can be written as
£ =
∑
i=1,2,3
ni
{
V
[
ci + v(yi) + βiπ(yi)u(di)
] − μ[ci + yi + π(yi)di − w
]}
+ λ1
[
c1 + v(y1) + α1π(y1)u(d1) − c2 − v(y2) − α1π(y2)u(d2)
]
+ λ2
[
c2 + v(y2) + α2π(y2)u(d2) − c3 − v(y3) − α2π(y3)u(d3)
]
,
where λi is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the incentive compatibility con-
straint preventing an agent of type i from mimicking an agent of type i + 1.
As above, the social planner’s objective function relies on the ex post preference
parameters βi , rather than on the ex ante preference parameters αi , in such a way
as to avoid the prevalence of regrets. On the contrary, the self-selection constraints
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rely on the ex ante preference parameters αi . The intuition behind this is that agents’s
will to mimic other agents depends on their ex ante perspectives. For instance, type-2
agents, when deciding whether they will pretend to be of type 3 or not, are subject to
their myopia when making that decision.
Note that our assumptions on preference parameters allow us to simplify the above
Lagrangian significantly. Given that we assume α2 = 0, the second self-selection con-
straint, which concerns myopic agents, only includes the comparison of first-period
consumption and sin good, so that we can simplify the terms related to the second
period. Regarding the first incentive compatibility constraint, it is clear that, given
that type-1 agents do not have any regret, we have α1 = β1 > 0. Therefore, one can
substitute for β1 instead of α1 in that constraint. Hence, the Lagrangian becomes
£ =
∑
i=1,2,3
ni
{
V
[
ci + v(yi) + βiπ(yi)u(di)
] − μ[ci + yi + π(yi)di − w
]}
+ λ1
[
c1 + v(y1) + βπ(y1)u(d1) − c2 − v(y2) − βπ(y2)u(d2)
]
+ λ2
[
c2 + v(y2) − c3 − v(y3)
]
,
where we use, for simplicity, the notation β ≡ β1 = β2 > 0.
The FOCs yield
(
V ′(x1) − μ
)
n1 + λ1 = 0,
(
V ′(x2) − μ
)
n2 + λ2 − λ1 = 0,
(
V ′(x3) − μ
)
n3 − λ2 = 0,
(
V ′(x1)βu′(d1) − μ
)
n1 + λ1βu′(d1) = 0,
(
V ′(x2)βu′(d2) − μ
)
n2 − λ1βu′(d2) = 0,
d3 = 0,
[
V ′(x1)
[
v′(y1) + βπ ′(y1)u(d1)
] − μ(1 + π ′(y1)d1
)]
n1
+ λ1
[
v′(y1) + βπ ′(y1)u(d1)
] = 0,
[
V ′(x2)
[
v′(y2) + βπ ′(y2)u(d2)
] − μ(1 + π ′(y2)d2
)]
n2
− λ1
[
v′(y2) + βπ ′(y2)u(d2)
] + λ2v′(y2) = 0,
[
V ′(x3)v′(y3) − μ
]
n3 − λ2v′(y3) = 0.
From the first three FOCs, we have:
V ′(x1) = μ − λ1
n1
,
V ′(x2) = μ − λ2 − λ1
n2
,
V ′(x3) = μ + λ2
n3
.
Myopia, regrets, and risky behaviors 303
Those equalities imply that x3 < x1 = x2.30 Hence, type-1 and type-2 agents have,
at the second-best, a higher ex post welfare than type-3 agents. Given that this was
not the case at the first-best, where x3 = x1 = x2, it follows that type-1 and type-2
agents tend to benefit from asymmetric information at the expense of type-3 agents.
Substituting those expressions in the FOCs for savings yields
u′(d1) = 1
β
,
u′(d2) = 1
(1 − λ2
μn2
)β
,
d3 = 0.
From which we have: d3 < d2 < d1. Note that type-2 agents have here a lower
second-period consumption than under the first-best, to an extent that depends on the
curvature of the temporal utility function. This change with respect to the first-best
comes from the second incentive compatibility constraint. Given that type-2 agents
do not see, ex ante, the relevancy of second-period consumption, the social planner
proposes a lower d2 than at the first-best, to prevent them from pretending to be of
type 3.
Regarding the consumption of sin goods, we have
v′(y1) = 1 − βπ ′(y1)
[
u(d1) − u′(d1)d1
]
,
v′(y2) = 1 − βπ ′(y2)
(
1 − λ2
μn2
)[
u(d2) − u′(d2)d2
]
,
v′(y3) = 1.
Thus, we obtain y1 < y2 < y3. Hence, whereas, at the first-best, type-1 and type-2
agents were treated similarly, this is no longer the case here, as type-2 agents enjoy a
higher level of sin good consumption than type-1 agents. Here again, this change is
due to the introduction of incentive compatibility constraints.
Comparing these FOCs with the first-best FOCs, we can see that
yFB1 = ySB1 ,
yFB2 < y
SB
2 ,
yFB3 = ySB3 .
Type-1 agents consume, at the second-best optimum, the same sin good quantity
as in the first-best. However, the second-best optimum involves a higher consumption
of sin goods for type-2 agents, in such a way as to prevent them from pretending to
30The inequality x3 < x1 follows from the first and the third conditions. Regarding the equality x1 = x2,
this comes from the first self-selection constraint: the ex post welfare of type-1 agents mimicking type-2
agents equals the one of type-2 agents.
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be of type 3. Note that the sin good consumption of type-3 agents is the same as in
the first-best.
But this does not imply that type-3 agents are not affected by the introduction
of self-selection constraints. Actually, in comparison with the first-best, type-3 are
worse off, while type-1 and -2 agents have a higher level of welfare:
xFB1 < x
SB
1 ,
xFB2 < x
SB
2 ,
xFB3 > x
SB
3 .
Thus, the social planner, by preventing type-2 agents from pretending to be of
type 3, offers them a basket that will, at the end of the day, make these better off than
type-3 agents. The latter are the victims of this, as type-3 agents see their welfare
falling in comparison with the first-best optimum. Actually, given that type-3 agents
have a lower utility, but keep the same sin good consumption and the same second-
period consumption as in the first-best, it must be the case that these enjoy a lower
first-period consumption than at the first-best. Hence, reducing the first-period con-
sumption of type-3 agents appears to be the strategy adopted by the social planner to
solve the incentive problem.
Moreover, type-1 agents are also better off at the second-best than at the first-best,
since the social planner offers them a better basket, which includes the same sin good
quantity and second-period consumption as in the first-best, but with more first-period
consumption, in such a way as to prevent them from pretending to be myopic. All in
all, the introduction of incentive compatibility constraints benefits to farsighted and
to myopic agents, but at the cost of a lower welfare for impatient agents.
Finally, it should be noted that our second-best optimum induces, by construction,
the self-selection of agents of all types, since no agent has, under that allocation of
resources, any incentive to lie on his type. Indeed, it is obvious from the second incen-
tive compatibility constraint that myopic agents (i.e. type-2 agents) will not want to
mimic impatient agents (i.e. type-3 agents). Moreover, it is clear from the first incen-
tive compatibility constraint that farsighted agents (i.e. type-1 agents) will not want
to pretend to be myopic (i.e. of type 2). But it is also easy to check that no agent has,
under those two incentive compatibility constraints, any temptation to mimic another
agent. For instance, one can show from the two incentive compatibility constraints
that type-3 agents will not pretend to be of type 1.31
4.2 Implementation
Let us now study how the above second-best optimum can be decentralized. For that
purpose, we shall follow the same method as in the first-best problem, and look for
31Indeed, combining the two self-selection constraints yields:
c3 + v(y3) − c1 − v(y1) = π(y1)u(d1) − π(y2)u(d2).
Note that, as d1 > d2 and y1 < y2, the RHS of that expression is necessarily non-negative, implying
that type-3 agents do not want to pretend to be of type 1.
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fiscal instruments such that, if imposed on the agents, their laissez-faire decisions will
coincide exactly with the second-best optimum.
Note first that, as in the first-best problem, the decentralization of the second-best
involves a forced savings system for type-2 agents, that is, a first period tax T2 and a
second-period pension P2 such that
T2 = π(y2)d2,
P2 = d2,
where d2 and y2 take their second-best levels. Given that ySB2 > y
FB
2 and d
SB
2 < d
FB
2 ,
it is not difficult to see that the tax and the pension will be here of smaller size in
comparison with the first-best levels:
T SB2 < T
FB
2 ,
P SB2 < P
FB
2 .
The decentralization of the second-best requires also a tax on the sin good for type-
2 agents, but this tax will now take a lower level than under the first-best. Indeed, the
FOC for optimal second-best y2 is
v′(y2) = 1 − βπ ′(y2)
(
1 − λ2
μn2
)[
u(d2) − u′(d2)d2
]
.
Comparing this with the FOC under laissez-faire yields an optimal tax θSB2 :
θSB2 = −π ′(y2)β
(
1 − λ2
μn2
)(
u(d2) − u′(d2)d2
)
> 0.
Given that 1 − λ2
μn2
< 1, we have
θSB2 < θ
FB
2 .
Thus, the second-best tax on the sin good is smaller than the first-best tax, as the
(second) incentive-compatibility constraint tends to counteract the correction of the
myopia: in order to prevent type-2 agents from pretending to be of type-3, we have
to weaken the tax on the sin good.
Finally, as in the first-best, those policies {T2,P2, θ2} do not suffice to decentral-
ize the social optimum. Some lump sum transfers across agents are also needed, to
satisfy the above FOCs. We shall not explore here those transfers in details, but it is
clear that, in the light of what was stressed above, type-3 agents tend, in comparison
with the first-best, to transfer more resources to type-2 agents, as their first-period
consumption is reduced with respect to the first-best, whereas the opposite holds for
type-2 agents.
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5 Double heterogeneity and linear taxation
In the previous sections, we studied the optimal taxation policy when the population
includes different types of agents, some agents being farsighted, whereas others are
myopic or impatient. In order to characterize the optimal policy under perfect infor-
mation (Sect. 3) and imperfect information (Sect. 4), we assumed, for simplicity, that
individual earnings were uniform, in such a way as to keep only one dimension of
heterogeneity. This assumption allowed us to derive a simple formula for the optimal
sin tax.
However, in the real world, agents differ in individual earnings, and a large em-
pirical literature identified the existence of statistically significant correlations be-
tween sin goods consumption and earnings. Regarding smoking behavior, Levine et
al. (1997), Heineck and Schwarze (2003), Van Ours (2004), Auld (2005), Braakmann
(2008), and Anger and Kvasnicka (2010) report the existence of a wage penalty at-
tached to smoking, ranging from 2% to 24%. As far as alcohol consumption is con-
cerned, empirical studies point also to a correlation, but of a positive sign (see Van
Ours 2004; Lye and Hirschberg 2004; Auld 2005). Hence, in the light of those studies,
one can hardly consider that the different types considered so far are homogeneous
in terms of earnings. On the contrary, agents consuming more sin goods (i.e. types 2
and 3), are also characterized by a lower or a higher level of earnings, depending on
the sin good. Taking this dimension of heterogeneity into account is thus most rele-
vant for the design of optimal sin taxes. Moreover, introducing heterogeneity in earn-
ings gives us also the opportunity to examine the regressiveness of sin taxes, which
depends on whether sin goods consumers earn less or more than non-consumers.
In order to study the impact of earnings inequality on the optimal sin tax, we will
concentrate here on linear taxation instruments. Note that, ideally we should deal
with this enriched setting by means of non-linear taxes or subsidies. Unfortunately,
even in the simplest case (two levels of wages and three types of agents), the number
of binding self-selection constraints would make the problem intractable. Therefore
we will restrict ourselves here to non-individualized linear taxation instruments. This
is not as general as a non-linear taxation framework, but this is analytically more
convenient, and it is also somewhat more realistic, since tax instruments are, in the
real world, most often linear.32
Note, however, that the use of linear fiscal instruments has also its own costs.
First of all, this restriction of the set of available taxation instruments consists of
nothing else than a kind of second-best approach to taxation. But another well-known
problem raised by linear instruments is that if an agent’s choice coincides with a
corner solution at the laissez-faire, a linear subsidy cannot induce him to change
his behavior. In the present context, we face that problem with the savings of myopic
agents. As we showed in Sect. 2, type-2 agents, being myopic, do not save at all at the
laissez-faire. Hence, a standard linear subsidy on savings cannot help decentralizing
the social optimum, as it is ineffective in the context of a corner solution at the laissez-
faire. Thus, to induce type-2 agents to have some resources in the second period, a
linear subsidy cannot do the job. What we need to introduce is a flat pension benefit.
32Besides realism concerns, our reliance on non-individualized linear taxation instruments can also be
defended on the grounds of the too large administrative costs induced by the use of finer fiscal instruments.
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As a consequence of all this, we will, throughout this section, use the following
non-individualized taxation instruments: a flat tax τ on earnings, a demogrant a, a
tax θ on the sin good, and a pension benefit P .
5.1 The agents’ decisions
The introduction of heterogeneity in earnings requires new notations. Throughout
this section, we shall denote the wage of agents of type i by wi . Thus, each individual
variable will now be indexed by the letter i for the wage rate wi , and by letters j =
1,2,3 for the three types of behaviors present in the baseline model: farsightedness,
myopia (with regrets) and impatience (without regrets).
Under a quadratic disutility of labor, the problem of an agent of type ij is to
maximize:
wiij (1 − τ) + a − sij − yij (1 + θ) −
2ij
2
+ v(yij ) + αijπ(yij )u
(
sij
π(yij )
+ P
)
,
where ij denotes the labor of agents of type ij , while αij denotes the time preference
parameter governing the decision of an agent of type ij . As above, we shall assume
that αi1 > 0 and αi2 = αi3 = 0.
From individual optimization, we have
ij = wi(1 − τ), j = 1,2,3,
si1 = si1(τa, θ,P ),
sij = 0, j = 2,3,
yij = yij (τ, a, θ,P ), j = 1,2,3.
Note that the labor supply decision does not depend on whether the agent is far-
sighted, myopic or impatient, but depends only on the wage level and on the tax
rate. Here again, type-2 and type-3 agents do not save, whereas the savings of type-1
agents is a function of the policy instruments.
5.2 The planner’s problem
Let us now consider the social planner’s problem. As above, we distinguish here
between αij , i.e. the ex ante time preference parameter of agents of type ij , and βij ,
which consists of the ex post time preference parameter of agents of type ij . As in
the basic model, farsighted agents and impatient agents do not exhibit any regret,
that is, there is a perfect coincidence between their ex ante preferences and their ex
post preferences: αi1 = βi1 > 0 and αi3 = βi3 = 0. However, type-2 agents exhibit
some regrets, in the sense that there is a gap between how they value their old-age
when making their decisions at the beginning of young adulthood and how they value
their old-age at the end of young adulthood. This discrepancy, which is at the origin
of regrets, is formalized by a difference between ex ante and ex post preferences:
αi2 = 0 < βi2. Moreover, for the ease of presentation, we also assume that βi1 = βi2.
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As in the baseline model, the social planner, when solving the problem of the op-
timal allocation of resources, will base his calculations on the ex post time preference
parameters βij , and not on the ex ante preferences αij , in such a way as to avoid the
occurrence of regrets among type-2 agents. Hence, the problem of the social planner
can be written as the maximization of the following Lagrangian:
£ =
∑
nijV
[
w2i (1 − τ)2
2
+ a − sij − yij (1 + θ) + v(yij )
+ βijπ(yij )u
(
sij
πij
+ P
)]
+ μ
∑
nij
(
τ(1 − τ)w2i + θyij − a − π(yij )P
)
where nij is the proportion of individuals of type j with productivity wi , the opti-
mal labor supply ij = wi(1 − τ) is substituted in, and μ is the Lagrange multiplier
associated with the revenue constraint.
From the FOCs for an interior maximum and using the envelope theorem, we
obtain the following FOCs, for respectively a, τ , P, and θ :
∑
nijV
′(xij ) +
∑
ni2V
′(xi2)υi2
∂yi2
∂a
+ μ
∑
nij
(
θ
∂yij
∂a
− 1 − π ′(yij )∂yij
∂a
P
)
= 0,
−
∑
nijV
′(xij )w2i (1 − τ) +
∑
ni2V
′(xi2)υi2
∂yi2
∂τ
+ μ
∑
nij
[
(1 − 2τ)w2i + θ
∂yij
∂τ
− π ′(yij )∂yij
∂τ
P
]
= 0,
∑
nijV
′(xij )βijπ(yij )u′(dij ) +
∑
ni2V
′(xi2)υi2
∂yi2
∂P
+ μ
∑
nij
[
θ
∂yij
∂P
− π ′(yij )∂yij
∂P
P − π(yij )
]
= 0,
−
∑
nijV
′(xij )yij +
∑
ni2V
′(xi2)υi2
∂yi2
∂θ
+ μ
∑
nij
(
yij + θ ∂yij
∂θ
− π ′(yij )∂yij
∂θ
P
)
= 0,
where υi2 ≡ βi2π ′(yi2)u(di2) < 0 denotes the utility loss that is due to the myopia of
type-2 agents.
Those optimality conditions allow us to characterize the optimal values of our
policy instruments a, τ , P, and θ . Note, however, that the simultaneous study of
the optimal levels of the four taxation tools would be quite laborious, as their values
are all related to each others through the government’s budget constraint. Therefore,
in order to keep the analysis simple, we will proceed as follows. To interpret those
optimality conditions, we will consider alternative pairs of fiscal instruments, holding
the other instruments equal to 0. Hence, we will here focus on the pairs (τ, a), (P, a),
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and (θ, a), while keeping, each time, the other fiscal tools set to 0. This simplification
will allow us to derive, in fine, closed-form solutions for the optimal levels of our
instruments.
Let us start with the pair (τ, a), composed of the tax rate on labor earnings and
the first-period demogrant. Regarding the optimal level of τ , the second FOC does
not allow us, on its own, to characterize the optimal level of τ , as a rise in τ must,
under the government’s budget constraint, imply a change in the demogrant a, in
such a way as to maintain the budget equilibrium. Hence the first FOC must also
be considered in the analysis. Therefore, in order to characterize the optimal level
of τ on the basis of the above optimality conditions, we will use a compensated
Lagrangian expression, whose derivative with respect to the policy instrument τ gives
us the effect of a variation of τ on the Lagrangian when that change is compensated
by a variation of the demogrant a that keeps the government’s budget equilibrium.
Using the optimality conditions, the derivative of the compensated Lagrangian can
be defined as:
∂ £˜
∂τ
≡ ∂£
∂τ
+ ∂£
∂a
da
dτ
= ∂£
∂τ
+ ∂£
∂a
(1 − 2τ)
∑
nijw
2
i ,
where £˜ denotes the compensated Lagrangian, and where the second term accounts
for the effect of a change in the tax rate τ on the first-period demogrant, under the
government’s budget equilibrium constraint.
Substituting for the above FOCs and equalizing to zero yields
∂ £˜
∂τ
= −(1 − τ)
∑
nijV
′(xij )
[
w2i −
∑
nijw
2
i
]
− τ
∑
nijV
′(xij )
∑
nijw
2
i +
∑
ni2V
′(xi2)υi2
∂y˜i2
∂τ
= 0,
where ∂y˜i2/∂τ denotes the effect of a change of τ on the sin good consumption of
type-2 agents, when that change is compensated by a change of the demogrant a in
such a way as to maintain the government’s budget equilibrium.
Regarding the pair (P, a), on can proceed in the same way as with the pair (τ, a),
and define the derivative of the compensated Lagrangian as follows:
∂ £˜
∂P
≡ ∂£
∂P
+ ∂£
∂a
da
dP
= ∂£
∂P
− ∂£
∂a
∑
nijπ(yij ),
where the second term accounts for the effect of a change in the pension P on the
first-period demogrant, under the government’s budget equilibrium.
Substituting for the above FOCs and equalizing to zero yields
∂ £˜
∂P
=
∑
nijV
′(xij )βijπ(yij )u′(dij ) −
∑
nijV
′(xij )
∑
nijπ(yij )
+
∑
ni2V
′(xi2)υi2
∂y˜i2
∂P
− μ
∑
nijπ
′(yij )P
∂y˜ij
∂P
= 0,
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where ∂y˜ij /∂P denotes the effect of a change of P on the sin good consumption of
agents of type ij , when that change is compensated by a change of the demogrant a
in such a way as to maintain the government’s budget equilibrium.
Finally, in the case of the pair (θ, a), the derivative of compensated Lagrangian
can be defined as
∂ £˜
∂θ
≡ ∂£
∂θ
+ ∂£
∂a
da
dθ
= ∂£
∂θ
+ ∂£
∂a
∑
nij yij ,
where the second term accounts for the effect of a change in the tax θ on the first-
period demogrant, under the government’s budget constraint.
Substituting for the above FOCs and equalizing to zero yields
∂ £˜
∂θ
= −
∑
nijV
′(xij )yij +
∑
nijV
′(xij )
∑
nij yij
+
∑
nijV
′(xij )υi2
∂y˜i2
∂θ
+ μθ
∑
nij
∂y˜ij
∂θ
= 0,
where ∂y˜ij /∂θ denotes the effect of a change of θ on the sin good consumption of
type-2 agents, when that change is compensated by a change of the demogrant a in
such a way as to maintain the government’s budget equilibrium.
With those simplifications, we can now obtain, from each of the above compen-
sated Lagrangian expression, a formula for each tax instrument, keeping in mind that
the other instruments are, in each case (except the demogrant), set equal to zero.33
τ ∗ = −cov(V
′(x),w2) + ∑ni2V ′(xi2)υi2 ∂y˜i2∂τ
−cov(V ′(x),w2) + EV ′(x)Ew2 ,
P ∗ = −cov(V
′(x),π) − ∑2,3 nijV ′(xij )π(yij )(1 − βij u′(P )) +
∑
ni2V ′(xi2)υi2 ∂y˜i2∂P
−μEπ ′(y) ∂y˜
∂P
,
θ∗ = −cov(V
′(x), y) + ∑ni2V ′(xi2)υi2 ∂y˜i2∂θ
−μE ∂y˜
∂θ
.
In order to interpret the formulae of the optimal tax instruments τ ∗, P ∗, and θ∗,
let us first examine the structure that is common to all those expressions.
The denominators of those expressions reflect the efficiency effect of the tax in-
strument: for τ ∗, the effect of τ on aggregate labor supply; for P ∗, the effect of
pensions on longevity, and for θ∗, the effect of the tax on the sin good consumption.
The larger those effects are, the lower the tax instruments should be ceteris paribus.
In the numerators, the covariance terms reflect the equity effect of the tax instru-
ment. The covariance terms are likely to be negative, and are closely linked to the
33We use here the E operator for expected values.
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concavity of V (x). Actually, we expect agents with a higher x to be also more pro-
ductive, to live longer, and to consume more sin good (even though this latter point is
more debatable). This leads to negative covariance terms, which tend, in the present
framework, to raise the optimal levels of the tax instruments. The higher the covari-
ance terms are in absolute value, and the larger the optimal values of tax instruments
are, everything else being unchanged. Note, however, that things could be different
with a more general functional form for individual utility. For example, it is not im-
possible to have a sin good consumption which decreases as income increases. In that
case, cov(V ′(x), y) could be positive, thus pushing for a lower sin tax.
The terms including υi2—the utility loss due to myopia—at the numerators in-
dicate how the tax instruments induce myopic agents to choose the right amount of
sin good y. Those terms depend on the effect of a rise in the instrument on sin good
consumption when this is compensated by a change in the transfer a in such a way as
to maintain the budget equilibrium. The sign of those compensated changes ∂y˜i2/∂θ ,
∂y˜i2/∂τ, and ∂y˜i2/∂P is likely to be negative, but it is not easy to see how large
those compensated changes are. Note that the size of the terms including υi2 depends
also on how sizeable the type-2 group is: the larger that group is, the larger the social
planner’s concern for those agents is, and thus the more the optimal tax instruments
will reflect the correction of type-2 agents’ myopia.
Finally, note that there is the second term of the numerator of the P ∗ formula,
which has to be distinguished between types 2 and 3. For type-3 agents, βi3 = 0, and
thus this term is positive, pushing P ∗ down. For type-2, it is negative (βi2 > 0), and
pushes P ∗ up.
All in all, the above tax formulas allow us to identify the major determinants of the
optimal fiscal instruments τ ∗, P ∗, and θ∗. As usual with this type of problem, the op-
timal taxes result from a trade-off between efficiency and equity concerns. However,
in the present framework, the correction for myopia is another key determinant of
the optimal fiscal instruments, whose size depends on how large the group of myopic
agents is.
Undoubtedly, the above tax formulas are quite abstract, and, in order to interpret
these further, we need to have a look at what the existing empirical literature can say
about the various determinants at work. For that purpose, we will, in the rest of this
section, focus on the optimal sin tax θ∗, since the goal of this paper is to cast a new
light on the optimal fiscal treatment of sin goods.
5.3 The determinants of the optimal sin tax
Let us now investigate what the above analysis can tell us about the optimal taxa-
tion of sin goods in real market economies. For that purpose, remind first that the
optimal sin tax θ∗ depends on three determinants: (1) how reactive average sin good
consumption is to the tax (i.e. the denominator); (2) how large the correction of the
myopia induced by the tax is (i.e. the terms including υi2); (3) how correlated sin
good consumption and individual welfare are (i.e. the covariance term). We will here
discuss what policy recommendations can be drawn from this, on the basis of empir-
ical studies on sin goods consumption.
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Regarding point (1), sin good consumption seems, in general, relatively little elas-
tic to changes in the tax, implying a low denominator, which would support the ne-
cessity of a large sin tax θ . This intuition for a low elasticity is confirmed by the lit-
erature on the price elasticity of the demand for cigarettes, which yields estimations
ranging between −0.3 and −0.5. For instance, Lewit and Coate (1982) estimated
an (uncompensated) price elasticity of −0.42, while Chaloupka and Wechsler (1997)
estimated an (uncompensated) price elasticity of −0.58.34 Regarding alcohol, exist-
ing studies, such as Saffer and Dhaval (2002, 2006), report even lower estimates for
the price elasticity, between −0.2 and −0.3, whereas Selvanathan (2006) estimates a
price elasticity of −0.6. Those relatively low elasticity values support, from the point
of view of efficiency, a large taxation of the sin good. Note, however, that if myopic
agents are also little sensitive to sin good taxation, then by point (2), it would not
make sense to tax sin good too much, which reduces the optimal θ ceteris paribus.
The little reactivity of sin good consumption to taxation seems thus to yield ambigu-
ous results in terms of sin good taxation: on the one hand, the low elasticity makes the
taxation of that good efficient, but, on the other hand, the perspectives of lowering,
through the tax, the welfare loss due to myopia are also reduced.
Moreover, regarding the second term of the numerator of θ [i.e. point (2)], it ap-
pears that the optimal tax on the sin good is also larger if a large proportion of the pop-
ulation suffers from myopia (i.e. a large ni2). In other words, the extent to which sin
good consumers formulate regrets or not affects the optimal tax to a large extent. As
stressed in Sect. 1, the proportion of regret-makers is, in the light of various studies,
especially large among smokers—about 80 to 90% of the smokers population—(see
Slovic 2001; Jarvis et al. 2002; Fong et al. 2004). Such a large proportion of smokers
with regrets supports a large ni2, and, thus, as far as cigarettes are concerned, a large
sin tax. Under such a high proportion of regret-makers (i.e. type-2 agents), the tax on
cigarettes would be mainly driven by the task of reducing the welfare burden from
myopia.35
Finally, it should be stressed that, with a more general utility function, point (3)
could play in the opposite direction, that is, toward a lower taxation of the sin good.
Clearly, if sin goods were mainly consumed by agents with a low productivity (i.e. if
sin goods were inferior goods), then the term cov(V ′(x), y) would be positive, which
would support a subsidization rather than a taxation of sin goods in the name of eq-
uity concerns, and would play against the other concerns defended above. This would
be consistent with the example of cigarettes, as the existing literature supports that
smoking prevalence is clearly decreasing with the education level, and, thus, with pro-
ductivity. For instance, in the US (2007), the lowest rates of smoking prevalence are
found among undergraduates (11.4%) and graduates (6.2%).36 Moreover, indepen-
dently from education, the individuals whose earnings are below the federal poverty
lines exhibit also a larger average smoking prevalence than the ones whose earnings
34More recently, Grignon (2007) finds, in France, a price elasticity of starting smoking equal to 0.203,
meaning that higher prices tend to delay smoking initiation less than proportionally. The population having
hyperbolic time preferences exhibits a slightly larger price elasticity of staring smoking, equal to 0.347.
35Note that, unfortunately, we do not have similar studies available for alcohol users.
36Data: the National Health Interview Survey 2007.
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are above the poverty line (28.8% against 20.3%).37 Furthermore, numerous studies
including Levine et al. (1997), Heineck and Schwarze (2003), Van Ours (2004), Auld
(2005), Braakmann (2008) and Anger and Kvasnicka (2010) all report the existence
of a wage penalty attached to smoking, ranging from 2% to 24%. All this suggests
that cov(V ′(x), y) might be, in the case of cigarettes, positive, which would tend to
lower, ceteris paribus, the optimal tax on cigarettes.
Note, however, that this third determinant of the optimal sin tax does not neces-
sarily go in the direction of less taxation. This depends on how productivity and sin
good consumption are correlated, which may vary with the sin good at stake. Take,
for instance, the case of alcohol consumption. As mentioned in Sect. 1, Van Ours
(2004), Lye and Hirschberg (2004), and Auld (2005) all report the existence of pos-
itive correlation between (moderate) alcohol consumption and individual earnings.
Given the existence of such an alcohol premium, the sign of cov(V ′(x), y) is likely
to be negative, which supports, ceteris paribus, a larger tax on alcohol. Hence, it ap-
pears that, from the point of view of covariance term present in the optimal sin tax
formula, not all sin goods should be treated equally. A differentiated treatment of sin
goods seems to be required, since some sin goods, like cigarettes, are associated with
lower earnings, whereas this is the opposite for other sin goods, such as alcohol.
All in all, the design of the optimal uniform tax on sin goods is not trivial, as there
seem to exist tensions between, on the one hand, efficiency concerns and myopia
reduction, which support a heavy taxation of the sin good, and on the other hand,
equity concerns, which tend, for some sin goods, to lower the optimal tax rate. The
large proportion of regretting sin goods consumers—at least among smokers seems
on the contrary, to support a high corrective tax.
6 Conclusions
Whereas sin goods consumption is widespread around the world, it is unquestionable
that each population is, on its own, far from uniform in its attitude toward sin goods.
Some people consume sin goods, others do not. Some sin goods consumers regret
their choices later on, whereas others do not regret.
The goal of this paper was to study the optimal taxation of sin goods in an econ-
omy where agents differ in how much sin good they consume, and in their attitude
toward past sin good consumption (regrets or not). Can we defend, in that economy,
a uniform treatment of sin goods consumers by the government?
In the absence of externalities, there exist at least three justifications for such a
uniform treatment of sin good consumers: (1) old paternalism (sin goods are “bad”
for everyone); (2) Good Samaritan effect (the State anticipates that it will have, in
fine, to help the persons in need, whatever their responsibility is); (3) informational
imperfection at the government’s level (impossibility for policy-makers to distinguish
between different motivations behind a given choice). The present study focused on
the third justification only.
37Data: the National Health Interview Survey 2007.
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We showed that informational imperfection does not suffice to justify a uniform
treatment of sin goods consumers. For that purpose, we first considered a model
where all agents have equal earnings, and where some—but not all—sin good users
have regrets later on. We argued in Sect. 3 that, if the government wants to protect
myopic agents against future regrets, the decentralization of the social optimum re-
quires a type-specific taxation on sin goods. It was also shown, in Sect. 4, that the
second-best optimum, although introducing distortions with respect to the first-best
(to avoid pooling equilibria), still recommends a differentiated treatment of sin goods
consumers, depending on the (more or less) myopic nature of their choices.38
Hence, if some theoretical support is to be found for the existing uniform treat-
ment, by the governments, of sin goods consumers of all kinds, this cannot be in the
informational constraints faced by governments. On the contrary, this support must
lie either in old paternalism, or in the Good Samaritan effect. Whereas the former is
hardly defendable, the latter does not provide a strong support for a uniform treat-
ment of all sin goods consumers, but invites further research on how a government
could make its commitments more plausible, making thus a differentiated treatment
possible again.
Those conclusions, which support the need for a differentiated treatment of sin
good consumers, were drawn under the assumption of a full homogeneity of earn-
ings in the population, which is a strong simplification. This is the reason why we
introduced, in Sect. 5, unequal earnings, and examined the design of optimal lin-
ear, non-individualized tax instruments, which better coincide with the taxation tools
available in the real world. As we showed, heterogeneity in individual earnings com-
plexifies the optimal intervention of the government, because of the potential con-
flicts between, on the one hand, efficiency concerns and myopia correction, and, on
the other hand, equity concerns, when sin goods are more consumed by agents with
lower earnings. The former concerns support a high taxation of sin goods, while the
latter support the opposite, so that the optimal sign and level of the uniform tax on
sin good is ambiguous.
Therefore, this paper emphasizes not only that the existing uniform taxation of
sin goods cannot be justified on the grounds of informational imperfection, but also
that such a uniform treatment is likely to be quite costly in terms of social justice.
Actually, if the correlation between earnings and risk-taking behaviors is negative
rather than positive, correcting uniformly for a myopia may be in strong opposition
with basic equity concerns. Hence, the limitation of the government’s tools to a uni-
form tax may not only penalize non-myopic risk-takers, but may also penalize the
myopic ones. Heterogeneity in earnings consists thus of an additional reason for a
differentiated treatment of risk-takers.
Our paper also highlighted the necessity to treat the various sin goods differently,
depending on their properties. For instance, given empirical studies showing that the
sign of the correlation between sin good consumption and earnings varies across sin
goods (for instance for cigarettes and alcohol), such differences need to be taken into
account when designing the optimal sin taxes. As a consequence, our results would
38Another interesting feature of the second-best optimum is that it does not only interfere with myopics’
choices, but, also, brings lower utility to rational risk-takers, to insure incentive compatibility.
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tend to support a differentiated treatment of sin goods, on the basis of their different
correlations with earnings, which affect the equity component of the optimal sin taxes
in various directions.
In sum, the present study emphasizes major difficulties raised by the design of op-
timal sin taxes. Note, however, that this study does not have the pretension to provide
a complete answer to the question at stake. Actually, we had, for the sake of simplic-
ity, to abstract from some important aspects of sin goods consumption, which may
affect optimal sin taxes. Firstly, we left aside externalities associated with the con-
sumption of sin goods. This is an obvious simplification, as most sin goods involve
externalities, whose internalization would invite Pigouvian taxes. Secondly, this study
did not consider the problem of addiction, which would require a more detailed time
structure than our two-period setting.39 Thirdly, we limited the set of governmental
instruments to pure fiscal instruments, and left aside other forms of intervention.40
Fourthly, this study presupposed a fixed partition of the population into different types
of agents, whereas that partition is the outcome of various socialization processes at
work in the economy, in which the government can play a significant role. Optimal
sin taxes should ideally take also that endogeneity into account.41 Hence, much work
remains to be done to provide a complete theory of optimal public intervention in the
context of sin goods consumption.
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